Whom to Listen to? Trusted Source and Retweet Behavior of the NYC Marathon and Hawaii False Alarm by XU, YUHUA & Pennington-Gray, Lori, PhD
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Travel and Tourism Research Association:
Advancing Tourism Research Globally 2018 ttra International Conference
Whom to Listen to? Trusted Source and Retweet
Behavior of the NYC Marathon and Hawaii False
Alarm
YUHUA XU
Lori Pennington-Gray PhD
Tourism Crisis Management Initiative, Department of Tourism, Recreation, and Sport Management, University of Florida
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/ttra
This Event is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Travel and Tourism
Research Association: Advancing Tourism Research Globally by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
XU, YUHUA and Pennington-Gray, Lori PhD, "Whom to Listen to? Trusted Source and Retweet Behavior of the NYC Marathon and
Hawaii False Alarm" (2018). Travel and Tourism Research Association: Advancing Tourism Research Globally. 4.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/ttra/2018/Grad_Student_Workshop/4
Whom to Listen to? Trusted Source and Retweet Behavior of the NYC Marathon and Hawaii 
False Alarm 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, huge losses financially and to human lives have brought the focus on crisis 
management back to the forefront of discussions globally. Crises, such as terror attacks, disturb the 
social order, as well as impact communications between stakeholders and authoritative 
organizations (Dowling 2000). The response to such acts can damage an organizations’ reputation 
and legitimacy (Patriotta, Gond, and Schultz 2011), and thus reduce their social capital (Adler and 
Kwon 2002). Due to the devastating nature of terror attacks, information dissemination is extremely 
important. Responsible organizations are more than ever interested in learning the rules of how 
people acquire and disseminate information. 
Global terrorist activities toward tourists are increasing. Ever since the 2013 Boston 
Marathon bombing (Wikipedia 2013), terrorism has become a recurring theme globally and 
influences how destinations and event organizers can be impacted by disasters. On October 31, 
2017, five days ahead of the New York marathon event, a terrorist-controlled truck accelerated onto 
a bike path at lower Manhattan and killed eight people and injured twelve people (Keneally 2017). 
This was titled the “deadliest terrorist attack in New York City since 911” (Berg 2017). What was 
important what that the tragedy occurred days in advance of a huge citywide event. This created 
uneasiness and an ongoing threat to both contestants and spectators planning to participate.  
Similarly, on January 13, 2018, a false missile alarm text was sent to residents and tourists 
of the state of Hawaii which read: “Ballistic missile threat inbound to Hawaii. Seek immediate 
shelter. This is not a drill.” This sparked a wave of panic across the state. The incident was 
worsened by a 38-minute delay before a correction alert was issued (Drezner 2017). The main 
concern with this false alarm was that it has the potential to undermine public confidence in the 
governmental alert systems and result in a reduced effectiveness during real crises.  
The purpose of this paper is to understand how these two cases highlight the need for 
governments and tourism agencies to identify where the traveling public may turn to in times of 
crisis and what messages they might receive. This study intends to compare twitter communications 
during crisis situations. To understand the role of trusted source, this study uses twitter as a target 
platform, using retweet behavior to reveal how different information sources are presented to the 
public, and how they may impact attitudes and behavior. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Social Capital and Social Media Network 
Social capital is considered to be the sum of "social resources"(Lin 2002), which are 
acquired by participating in social networks. Social capital is also believed to be facilitated from 
actions initiated within social structures (Coleman 1988), from which actors can gain benefits. As a 
form of capital, social capital comes from each actor's investments in their own networks. For 
individuals to gain comparative advantages between different networks, according to structural 
holes theory, one should stand as a mediator between two or more closely connected networks (Burt 
2004). The “gatekeeper” (Burt 2009) typically transfers information from one network to another, 
because novel information is most likely to be transferred through these “weak ties” (Granovetter 
1973). 
Twitter can be considered a social network site, mainly because it allows users to connect to 
each other and also publicize their profiles in an online network (Ellison 2007, Recuero and Zago 
2016). Kaigo (2012) suggests that Twitter has become a base to construct social capital and it plays 
a pro-social role during crisis (Kaigo 2012). Essentially, social media forms a virtual social network 
that allows individuals to bridge their social capital. Social media users thus can generate more 
social ties (Zhao 2006) for the construction of social capital through virtual networks. Also, the use 
of social media is related to one’s social capital level. Shah (2001) found that information use on the 
internet is positively correlated with the production of social capital, while social-recreational usage 
is negatively correlated (V. Shah 2001).  
Guided by social capital theory and structural holes theory, we assume that individuals tend 
to follow and retweet the information from authority organizations which have greater social 
capital. Also, emergency responders tend to be actively engaged in social media networks and 
search for informational loopholes to build greater social capital for future communication. 
 
Crisis Communication on Twitter 
Possessing 330 million active users globally (Twitter), Twitter has been considered an 
important information distribution channel during crises (Cameron et al. 2012, Cassa et al. 2013, 
Mills et al. 2009, Hughes and Palen 2009, Kaigo 2012). By attaching photos, locations and 
documents, tweeter is able to effectively communicate the severity and range of a crisis (White 
2010). Imbedded within the networking nature and its two-way communication ability (Terpstra et 
al. 2012), Twitter forms a solid platform to monitor information dissemination how information is 
spread during terror attacks.  
A key motivator for Twitter users is getting information in a timely way (Mischaud 2007, 
Java et al. 2007). Tweets sent during mass emergencies also contain more displays of information 
broadcasting and brokerage (Hughes and Palen 2009). Heverin and Zach (2010) analyzed 6000 
tweets and found out that citizens are the major authors (91.5%), and that 79% of the messages 
published were information-related (Heverin and Zach 2010). 
In the field of twitter user’s behavior, Romero et al. (2011) argue that a majority of Twitter 
users are passive information consumers, not willing to share and create information on the network 
(Romero et al. 2011). However, there is also evidence showing that general Twitter users seem to 
have evolved over time to offer more of an information-sharing purpose (Hughes and Palen 2009). 
Anyhow, retweets’ information should be highly valued and explored. This study will mainly focus 
on the retweet data to discover the pattern of crisis communications during terror attack. 
The main purpose of this study was to examine tweets in times of crisis in terms of trusted 
source (retweeted messages) and content during different phases of the crisis. Crises are said to go 
through four phases: reduction, readiness, response and recovery. Some have suggested this is a 
phasic approach to managing a crisis and that you move from one phase to the next in a temporal 
fashion. Responses to the crisis occur during all phases of the crisis however most frequently they 
occur during (response) and after (recovery) the crisis event. Thus, based on the above discussions, 
two research questions were put forward: 
RQ1: What are the most trusted sources (as operationalized by retweets) during terror 
attacks? 
RQ2: Does the retweeted information vary by the terror attack phase of the crisis? 
  
METHODOLOGY 
Structured Twitter data monitoring and collection was carried out. Data collection was 
performed by RapidMiner Studio, equipped with a pre-written data mining operator specifically 
intended to collect tweets from Twitter. The attributes acquired were: original tweet text, tweet 
created time, total retweet counts for each tweet, language, source and user information. 
The case of the New York Marathon: The terrorist attack stroke on October 31, 03:04 pm 
and lasted for four minutes until recognized by the police (Keneally 2017). After four days, on 
November 5, the NYC marathon event began from 9:20 am until the afternoon. To better monitor 
the variations of the twitter users’ reaction and make accordant comparisons, one more day of 
twitter data was collected after the terror event. Using keywords “2017 New York Marathon 
attack”, 3,150 twitter records were collected between October 31 and November 6, 2017. Thus, 
retweets and tweets were captured in the recovery phase of the crisis.  
The case of the Hawaii False Alarm: The false alarm text message was sent out by the 
Hawaii Emergency Management Agency (EMA) at 8:07 am (HST), January 13, 2018. To reveal the 
most relevant and authentic emergency response from twitter, the study only applied the data 
generated on January 13, before 9:00 am (HST), when the false alarm was corrected. Thus, tweets 
and retweets were captured in the response phase of the crisis.  
For RQ1, descriptive analysis was conducted where tweets were put in Excel and analyzed 
based on frequency, account, retweet. The most highly retweeted account and the most frequently 
mentioned accounts were listed out. 
For RQ2, the mostly retweeted tweets were listed with content analyses conducted to elicit 
the topic of the tweets. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Finding the Themes: Most retweeted tweets 
For NYCM, there were 122,595 retweets in total. The most popular tweets focused on four 
topics: 1) news of the trunk attack; 2) announcements that the events will run as scheduled; 3) extra 
security to be offered for the event; 4) encouragement and cheering for participants. (See Appendix 
1). For the Hawaii alert, there were 328,714 retweets in total. The most popular tweets focused on: 
1) over 50% of the recopies of the original false alarm mentioned Hawaii Customer Visitors Bureau 
(CVB) official account; 2) the correction of the false alert; 3) grateful for the fact that it was a false 
alarm. (See Appendix 2) 
From the topics, we observed that urgent terror attacks like the Hawaii case tend to hold the 
publics’ focus on the attack itself, and that personal emotions are more expressed in the information. 
In potential terror attacks such as the NYCM case, objective information is more likely to be 
disseminated than subjective emotions. We also noticed that among all the retweets on the Hawaii 
alarm, the official Twitter account of Hawaii CVB was mentioned immensely at the very first stage 
of communication. When the first crisis responder, EMA was absent, the public began to search for 
an alternative authority for secured confirmation. Unfortunately, the CVB made no response to the 
massive amount of requests.  
 
Trusted Source: Mostly retweeted/mentioned accounts 
The top 10 retweeted accounts for both events are individual accounts, indicating that the 
social media users tend to share information from individual sources rather than official public 
accounts, no matter whether it is for information dissemination or for aftermath discussions. 
 The top 10 mentioned account for NYCM were mostly media accounts, while the Hawaii 
event consisted mostly of individual accounts, however one of these was an elected official. This 
indicates that in emergency communications during critical terror attacks, people tend to read and 
share the information from known sources, while conversely, in an aftermath terror attack, people 
tend to look at information from media.  
Another interesting phenomenon was that although CNN was mentioned 65,376 times 
(81.6% out of the top ten total) in the top ten retweets, their direct number of retweets was only 268, 
falling out of the top ten retweeted sources. This begs the question: if retweet is a measure of trusted 
source- how can this be interpreted? Perhaps, this might be explained by Granovetter’s social weak 
tie theory: where the social media tie from large media platforms (like CNN) to individuals are 
comparatively weak, however when platforms have novel information to share, they will still be 
recognized by the citations from strong ties within the social media network (Granovetter 1973).
 
Table 1 Top10 retweeted account for NYCM 
Information 
Source Account Type 
Retweet 
Counts 
pendulum5884 individual 604 
Marcelo Moura individual 497 
Real_Infinity95 individual 459 
NY Nite Owl individual 399 
Ruth Maia individual 382 
Neus individual 366 
rashid al dosari individual 356 
Lotraine Hubertus individual 336 
Susan individual 326 
Nevin Singh individual 318 
 
Table 2 Top10 retweeted account for Hawaii Event  
Information 
Source Account Type 
Retweet 
Counts 
Tulsi Gabbard Individual 
(elected 
official) 
22699 
Hawaii EMA governmental 15782 
?? individual 2112 
Joe individual 1560 
ryan robbins individual 1530 
Rachelle Pavlova individual 1322 
{~_~} ❄️ individual 1202 
ENDUT! HOCH 
HECH! 
individual 1138 
natalie ✨ individual 1138 
MDS individual 1109 
 
Table 3 Top10 mentioned account for NYCM 
Mentioned 
Account 
Account 
Type 
Retweet 
Counts 
CNN media 65376 
CBSNews media 5809 
ABC media 3553 
thehill media 1853 
USATODAY media 1082 
BuzzFeedNews media 756 
nymarathon organizer 498 
runnersworld media 466 
AlBoeNEWS media 400 
NBC media 284 
 
Table 4 Top10 mentioned account for Hawaii Event 
Mentioned 
Account Account Type 
Retweet 
Counts 
hawaii government(CVB) 182250 
trishquema individual 32857 
Tulsi Gabbard 
Individual (elected 
official) 22699 
stopalready23 individual 21200 
hawaiigirl3 individual 16302 
Hawaii EMA government 15782 
baobaejin individual 5125 
arawnsley individual 4872 
RVAwonk individual 4488 
dezzyybearr individual 3510 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Large-scale terror attacks can generate negative impacts on the host destination and the 
tourism industry (Pizam and Smith 2000). Building up effective crisis communication channels and 
formulating pertinent strategies needs to be a process rather than a one-time operation. 
Understanding the perceived credibility of the source of the message in concert with the content of 
the message is critical. In today’s environment where social media plays a critical role in crisis 
communications, understanding these variables within the context of social media is even more 
important. Thus, this study looked at the 2017 New York Marathon and the 2018 Hawaii False 
Missile Alarm, as cases to understand retweet behavior during the two-different terror attacks.  
Through analysis of the real twitter data, we found out that the trusted source for the public 
varies by the phase that the crisis is in. During the response phase, the public tended to source 
information from strong social ties (Granovetter 1973), such as elected officials, acquaintances, 
friends, families. However, when it came to the recovery phase, the public was more likely to 
acquire and share information from the media. Although it was acknowledged that individuals 
received information more quickly and easily from their “strong social ties”, attention should focus 
on guiding the public to connect to stronger social media vertices, to offer instant and novel 
information during the response phase of the crisis.  
Also, the content shared on Twitter during crises varied by phase of the crisis, which is 
understandable and follows theory. During a crisis response phase (Hawaii case) tweets tended to 
have more subjective emotional in content. As well, the content of the tweets focused more heavily 
on the event. During the recovery phase, things were reversed.  
These findings suggest that emergency responders and media as credible sources may and 
should alter their messages depending on the phase of the crisis. Similarly, during the response 
phase, credible sources which tend to be dominated by individuals or publics should find ways to 
weave more objective and informative information into the messages. These source providers can 
gain more objective information from the “official source for information.” Also during the 
response phase, crisis information tended to be more emotional and subjective.  
Furthermore, findings from this study suggested limited contributions from governmental 
organizations. This is disappointing! The emergency responders, government and/or tourism 
destination managers needs to build more bridges and deeper bonds with residents and visitors so 
they can gain more trust. This trust is important particularly during times of response. Given there  
are two ways to build social capital (Putnam 2001), emergency responders should build up more 
unique links with different social networks in order to gain more novel information. It is also 
required that responders invest resources to maintain those networks (Burt 2009).  
Pizam (1999) pointed out that once the crisis happens, the best way to cope with it is to 
initiate cooperation between government and tourism industry officials, plus ensure a partnership of 
governments and the local community. (Pizam and Smith 2000). Developing a structural 
relationship via social media between these leaders and the residents and tourists is one way to 
establish and reinforce social ties and build social capital.  
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APPENDIX 1: Top 30 Retweeted Tweets for NYCM 
Tweet Content Retweet 
RT @Scavino45: “New York City Marathon organizers say Sunday race will still take place despite terror attack”  
#NYCStrong?? 
32347 
RT @CNN: After terror attack, a resilient city rises up to support its runners | via @CNNopinion 28396 
RT @CNN: The New York City Marathon will go on as planned this weekend -- but with beefed-up security 22748 
RT @NYGovCuomo: Governor Cuomo thanks the National Guard and holds a security briefing ahead of the New York 
City Marathon 
5916 
RT @CNN: Heightened security is being put in place for Sunday's New York City Marathon 5564 
RT @CBSNews: More than 50K people are signed up for the New York City Marathon on Sunday & the NYPD is 
increasing security plans: 
3350 
RT @cnnbrk: Authorities increase security for New York marathon 3180 
RT @cnni: After terror attack, a resilient city rises up to support its runners | via @CNNopinion 2520 
RT @ABC: NEW: NY Gov. Cuomo announces increased deployment of security personnel ahead of tomorrow's New 
York City Marathon. 
1989 
RT @thehill: New York marathon to continue with enhanced security after terror attack 1853 
RT @cnni: The New York City Marathon will go on as planned this weekend -- but with beefed-up security 1670 
RT @WSJ: Heightened security in New York for this Sunday’s marathon 1368 
RT @CBSNews: "We've enhanced security for [the New York City Marathon] also. It's going to be a very safe event," 
NYPD Chief Gomez says htt… 
1274 
RT @CBSNews: In wake of truck attack, authorities plan huge police presence for Sunday's New York City Marathon 1156 
RT @ABC: Police ramping up security for New York City Marathon after deadly truck attack. 960 
RT @cnni: Heightened security is being put in place for Sunday's New York City Marathon 897 
RT @BuzzFeedNews: NYC attack:• 5 Argentinians, 2 Americans, 1 German killed • 9 still hospitalized • “Enhanced” 
security for marathon 
756 
RT @USATODAY: New York Marathon: International runners undaunted after terror attack. 713 
RT @AlBoeNEWS: The New York City Marathon will go on as planned on Sunday despite today’s terror attack in 
Manhattan - ESPN 
400 
RT @RTSportNews: New York City Marathon will be held as planned despite Manhattan terrorist attack 400 
RT @USATODAY: "The marathon will go on because New York goes on," governor says. #NYCTerroristAttack 360 
The New York City Marathon will go on as planned this weekend -- but with beefed-up security 330 
RT @runnersworld: .@nycmarathon officials are monitoring security following the terror attack in NYC today 256 
RT @CNN: Amid heightened security following last week’s terror attack, runners conquer the New York City Marathon 228 
RT @ABCPolitics: Police ramping up security for New York City Marathon after deadly truck attack. 224 
RT @runnersworld: .@nycmarathon officials are monitoring security following the terror attack in NYC yesterday 210 
“New York City Marathon organizers say Sunday race will still take place despite terror attack” #NYCStrong?? 196 
RT @NBCNewYork: Here's what you need to know about the increased security measures around NYC following 
Tuesday's attack 
187 
 
  
APPENDIX 2: Top 30 Retweeted Tweets for Hawaii False Alarm 
Tweet Content Retweet 
RT @hawaii: Ballistic missile threat inbound to Hawaii. Seek immediate shelter. This is not a drill.  182250 
RT @trishquema: Ballistic missile threat to Hawaii - not a drill. Tell me someone just pressed the wrong alert 
button.  32857 
HAWAII - THIS IS A FALSE ALARM. THERE IS NO INCOMING MISSILE TO HAWAII. I HAVE 
CONFIRMED WITH OFFICIALS THERE IS NO…  22699 
RT @stopalready23: HAWAII IS RECEIVING A BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT INBOUND TO HAWAII. 
THE TV AND PHONES ARE SAYING THIS IS NOT A DRILL. 21200 
RT @hawaiigirl3: What?! A ballistic missile?! #Hawaii  16302 
NO missile threat to Hawaii. 15782 
RT @baobaejin: Hawaii got a ballistic missile threat but there’s nothing on tv and our sirens didn’t go off??? 
What’s going on damn 5125 
RT @arawnsley: Before we get too far down this road, remember that Hawaii has recently been testing its new 
missile alert system. 4872 
RT @RVAwonk: There's a ballistic missile threat and Hawaiians are being told to seek shelter immediately... and 
WHY IS NO ONE TALKING ABOUT… 4488 
RT @dezzyybearr: WHY DID I JUST GET A EMERGENCY SAYING THERES A BALLISTIC MISSILE 
THREAT INBOUND TO HAWAII N ITS NOT A DRILL.... ????? 3510 
RT @davidwolman: I’m in a parking lot in Waimea, Hawaii right now and everyone’s phones are buzzing with a 
warning about an incoming missil… 1944 
RT @rveIvts: AO I JUST GOT AN ALERT THAT THERE IS A BALLISTIC MISSILE TOWARDS HAWAII 
WHAT  1856 
RT @daviladamian: Ballistic missile threat to #Hawaii? Just got this alert on my phone!  #northkorea  1495 
RT @TimFernholz: Pentagon duty press officer is not able to comment on any missile threat to Hawaii. 1428 
RT @ZacZarbis: I just got an amber alert of a ballistic missile threat inbound to Hawaii 1230 
RT @peterdaou: What on earth is going on with this ballistic missile threat to Hawaii everyone is sharing?  1100 
RT @mnishi41: 「hawaii missile」で検索すると多数同じ書き込みが。なにが起こったんだろう……  1026 
RT @easytyga: Did anyone else’s iPhone just tell them there’s a ballistic missile headed for Hawaii and to take 
cover immediately? 960 
RT @LindaNagata: Phone just had an emergency alert. Ballistic missile threat in #Hawaii. 792 
RT @ajreid: A *lot* of people are tweeting about receiving an "inbound missile" alert in Hawaii  740 
Ballistic missile threat inbound to Hawaii. Seek immediate shelter. This is not a drill.  729 
I’m in a parking lot in Waimea, Hawaii right now and everyone’s phones are buzzing with a warning about an 
incoming…  648 
RT @RaulRules808: @HawaiiNewsNow just received a “Ballistic Missile Threat Inbound To Hawaii. Seek 
Shelter. This is not a drill” message on… 369 
RT @richardhine: People are tweeting about a ballistic missile threat to Hawaii  322 
Ballistic missile threat to Hawaii - not a drill. Tell me someone just pressed the wrong alert button.  319 
HAWAII IS RECEIVING A BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT INBOUND TO HAWAII. THE TV AND PHONES 
ARE SAYING THIS IS NOT A DRILL. 265 
There's a ballistic missile threat and Hawaiians are being told to seek shelter immediately... and WHY IS NO ONE 
TA…  264 
What?! A ballistic missile?! #Hawaii  247 
RT @MarkJWestpfahl: Phones in Hawaii have been receiving ballistic missile emergency notifications to their 
phones in the last 10 minutes.… 200 
RT @TimInHonolulu: TV is broadcasting the attack warning. It is not a drill. US @PacificCommand is reporting a 
balistic missile attack on H… 189 
 
